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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1986-1987

A Faculty Symposium
BANKING LAW
Ronald L. Hersbergen*

BANKS AND THE LOUISIANA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

Section 1405 of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law' declares "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce" to be unlawful; however, section
1406(1) of the law exempts from that prohibition "[a]ctions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of ... the state bank commissioner
... and any bank chartered by or under the authority of the United
States acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States
to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices.''2 Because the quoted
language falls short of clarity, state banks have asserted exempt status
under the Unfair Trade Practices Act in at least four reported cases.
In a case discussed in a prior symposium article,' the Bank of New
Orleans asserted section 1406 in defense to the claim of one of its credit
cardholders that the bank's knowing act of filing collection suits in a
venue inconvenient to the cardholder-debtor was "unfair" within the
meaning of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 4 The fourth circuit court

Copyright 1987, by LOUISlANA LAW REVIEW.

Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. R.S. 51:1401-1418 (1987).
2. La. R.S. 51:1405 (1987). The "state banking commissioner" is now known as
the commissioner of financial institutions. La. R.S. 6:2(4), 101 (1986).
*

3. Hersbergen, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Banking Law, 43 La. L. Rev.
309, 321-25 (1982).

4.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in 1976 that
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held that section 1406 of the Unfair Trade Practices Act did not exempt

the bank under the particular facts involved, but did so on unconvincing
grounds.5
In two recent Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decisions,
the applicability to banks of section 1406 has been considered. In State
Bank of Commerce v. Demco of Louisiana,6 the defendant-debtor as-

serted in reconvention that a bank officer's letter to a third party (who
owed an account to defendant) had violated section 1405, damaging
defendant's business and trade reputation. Reasoning that monitoring
and collecting a loan are powers "incidental to the power to loan money"
under section 242 of Title 6 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, the fifth

circuit held that under section 1406, the State Bank of Commerce was
exempt from the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The court's reasoning was

essentially the same as that of the fourth circuit in the earlier Bank of
New Orleans case, to wit, if the act or practice in question was the
exercise of "banking" activities, no cause of action can be thereon
premised under the Unfair Trade Practices Act. Such reasoning is flawed.
The language of section 1406, while not without ambiguity, seems ob-

viously to seek non-duplication of regulation of banking activities, so
that if the commissioner of financial institutions has, and exercises, the
power to regulate unfair or deceptive practices by banks, such banks
are to be exempt from an action under section 1405.
In a subsequent decision, First FinancialBank v. Butler,7 the fifth
circuit has applied the "non-duplication" view of section 1406, rather
than the "banking activities" view, in determining the applicability of
section 1406 to a federally chartered savings and loan institution. 8 Such

the Federal Trade Commission could enjoin consumer-debt collection suits brought in
inconvenient forums against out-of-state consumers. Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976). Because an act violative of the FTC Act of 1914 is
presumptively violative of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act, see Guste v. Demars,
330 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Moore v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 364
So. 2d 630 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), the crucial issue in the Bank of New Orleans case
was the applicability of the Unfair Trade Practices Act to a bank.
5. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co. v. Phillips, 415 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1982), criticized by Hersbergen, supra note 3, at 321-23.
6. 483 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
7. 492 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
8. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took a similar view of
section 1406 in Lamarque v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 197 (5th
Cir. 1986), in holding that an unfair trade practice claim against an insurer was not
excluded because the insurance commissioner's regulatory power is not distinct from section
1405. But see Comeaux v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 490 So. 2d 1191 (La. App. 3d.
Cir. 1986) (the failure of an insurer to pay uninsured motorist proceeds was held exempt
as an "action or transaction" subject to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner).
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institutions are under the regulatory authority of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, which agency has and exercises the authority to issue rules
prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices by institutions within
its jurisdiction. 9
The Louisiana Supreme Court has now taken the perfunctory "banking activities" view of section 1406. The decision on point, Scott v.
Bank of Coushatta,0 neither cites to nor discusses the "non-duplication"
view of the Butler case. Thus, unless the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions exercises his jurisdiction to regulate deceptive and unfair
acts or practices by banks, such acts or practices will be unregulated.
The supreme court should reconsider what the legislature intended by
section 1406; for its part, the legislature should restate that intent with
clarity. Virtually every state has some form of deceptive practices act,
most of which contain an exemption provision similar to section 1406.
The relatively few decisions from the other jurisdictions on the issue
tend to support the non-duplication view."
THE BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP

ContractualStipulations That Vary the Effect of the U.C.C.
The ability of banks to contractually vary the effect of the provisions
of Title 10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes (the "Commercial Laws")
has been noted in a prior issue of this publication. 2 Although not
without limits, there is considerable latitude afforded by Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:1-102(3) and 4-103(1) for variation by agreement. One
obvious provision that a payor bank may wish to vary is Louisiana
Revised Statutes 10:4-302(a), under which a payor bank is "accountable"

9. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (1982). See also NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931
(4th Cir. 1987).
10. 512 So. 2d 356 (La. 1987).
11. NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1987); Matanuska Maid, Inc.
v. State, 620 P.2d 182 (Alaska 1980); State v. O'Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska
1980); In re Real Estate Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 95 Wash. 2d 297, 622 P.2d 1185
(1980); State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wash. 2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972); State v.
Sterling Theatres Co., 64 Wash. 2d 761, 394 P.2d 226 (1964); Tokarz v. Frontier Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 33 Wash. App. 456, 656 P.2d 1089 (1983). The Washington Consumer
Protection Act does not apply to "actions or transactions otherwise ... regulated under
laws administered by the insurance commissioner . . . or ... any other regulatory body ......
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.170 (1978). The Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act exempts an "act or transaction regulated under laws administered
by the state, by a regulatory board or commission . . ., unless the law regulating the act
or transaction does not prohibit the practices declared unlawful [by the Consumer Protection Act]." Alaska Stat. 45.50.481 (1986).
12. See Hersbergen, supra note 3, at 309-14. See generally Hersbergen, The BankCustomer Relationship Under the Louisiana Commercial Laws, 36 La. L. Rev. 29 (1975).
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for the face amount of any demand item (other than a documentary
draft), whether properly payable or not, retained beyond the midnight
deadline." The liability of a payor bank under section 4-302 is virtually
absolute. 14 Such a variance agreement may take the form of a clearing
house agreement providing for an extended midnight deadline on all
items presented through the clearing house, 5 or a simple agreement
between the depositor-holder and the drawee-payor bank by which a
particular item can be held beyond the midnight deadline without accountability, 6 or, as in Springhill Bank & Trust Co. v. Citizens Bank

13. The accountability of a payor bank under La. R.S. 10:4-302(a) has been discussed
in two prior symposium articles. See generally Hersbergen, Developments in the Law,
1982-1983-Banking Law, 44 La. L. Rev. 247, 253-61 (1983); Hersbergen, Developments
in the Law, 1979-1980-Banking Law, 41 La. L. Rev. 313, 323-30 (1981).
14. A collecting bank (La. R.S. 10:4-105 (1983)) which fails to abide by its midnight
deadline faces liability in the nature of a negligence action, see La. R.S. 10:4-202 (1983);
a payor bank holding an item beyond its midnight deadline is accountable under La.
R.S. 10:4-302 (1983). The difference can be seen in Marcoux v. Van Wyk, 572 F.2d 651
(8th Cir. 1978), in which a collecting bank did hold sight drafts beyond its midnight
deadline, but in circumstances clearly suggesting that the drawer-creditors were dealing
with an insolvent drawee; thus, even had the collecting bank observed its midnight deadline
and timely returned the drafts, the drawer-creditors' loss would not have been thereby
avoided. Had those creditors deposited demand checks of the debtor, which were held
beyond the midnight deadline by the drawee-payor bank, the fact of the drawer-debtor's
insolvency would have been irrelevant. See, e.g., Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Bank of MidJersey, 499 F. Supp. 1022 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1981); Whalen
& Sons Grain Co. v. Missouri Delta Bank, 496 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Blake v.
Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). There are a limited
number of valid "excusing" circumstances by which the midnight deadline can be expanded.
See La. R.S. 10:4-106 to 4-108 (1983).
15. See West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'l Exchange Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d
587 (1968).
16. See Western Air & Refrig., Inc. v. Metro Bank, 599 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1979);
Marfa Nat'l Bank v. Powell, 512 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). The depositor will
typically so agree upon being informed of a current lack of sufficient funds in the drawer's
account with which to pay the presented item. There is, however, a limitation on all such
agreements: the object of the agreement cannot be to disclaim a bank's responsibility for
failure to exercise due care. La. R.S. 10:4-103(1) (1983). Thus, where the object of the
agreement is to extend the midnight deadline in an effort to obtain payment from funds
or credits coming into the drawer's account during the extended period, the agreement
is valid, as in the Powell case. Where, however, the variance agreement extends the time
within which a depositary bank may "charge back" to the depositor's account an item
that has been returned unpaid by the drawee-payor bank, such an agreement may be
viewed as an invalid attempt to disclaim the depositary bank's responsibility to exercise
due care in returning the item or sending notice of dishonor under La. R.S. 10:4-202(l)(b)
(1983). See Sunshine v. Bankers Trust Co., 34 N.Y.2d 404, 314 N.E. 2d 860 (1974).
The depositing-holder or the depositary bank may also send to a drawee-payor bank
an item "for collection" as opposed to "for payment," making an agreement, in essence,
that the payor bank will act as a collecting bank and not be liable for failure to return
an item within the midnight deadline. See Corsica Livestock Sales, Inc. v. Sumitomo
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& Trust Co.,' 7 an agreement between two or more banks that unpaid
items may be returned on the third banking day rather than within the
applicable midnight deadline.
Variance agreements are not without problems, however, as the
Springhill Bank case reveals. For instance, the trial court found the
agreement was "to the effect that either bank could return unpaid items
on the third working day rather than giving notice before its midnight
deadline."'" If the two banks customarily, but for the "three day"
agreement, would have merely given notice of dishonor as to unpaid
items-as opposed to returning such items-prior to the midnight deadline, then the "three day" agreement was a good idea indeed, because
accountability for late return of unpaid items is only avoided by the
giving of notice of dishonor when the unpaid item is held for protest
or otherwise unavailable for return. 9 In other words, a dishonoring
payor bank does not have the option of returning the item, or giving
notice of dishonor, prior to the midnight deadline-it must return the
item whenever the item is available for return.20
The Springhill Bank case also demonstrates another (and obvious)
problem of variance agreements: what items were covered by the agreement. The plaintiff collecting bank asserted that only items not paid
due to insufficient funds, missing endorsements, closed accounts, or

Bank, 726 F.2d 374 (S.D. Cal. 1983); Idaho Forest Indus. v. Minden Exch. Bank &
Trust Co., 212 Neb. 820, 326 N.W.2d 176 (1982); David Graubart, Inc. v. Bank Leumi
Trust Co., 48 N.Y.2d 554, 399 N.E.2d 930, 423 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1979).
17. 505 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
18. Id. at 868.
19. La. R.S. 10:4-301(1) (1983).
20. A reading of La. R.S. 10:4-302 (1983) by itself does suggest the availability of
such an option, for that section states that a payor bank "is accountable for the amount
of . . . a demand item . . . if the bank . . . does not pay or return the item or send
notice of dishonor until after its midnight deadline" (emphasis added). But, La. R.S.
10:4-301(1) (1983) only permits a payor bank to have the deferred posting period of a
midnight deadline if it settles for the item before midnight of the banking day of receipt;
if it does so, the payor bank may revoke that settlement, upon deciding to dishonor the
item, if it has not made final payment, and if "before its midnight deadline it returns
the item; or sends written notice of dishonor if the item is held for protest or is otherwise
unavailable for return." A payor bank sending a notice of dishonor before its midnight
deadline, but retaining after the midnight deadline an item "available for return" is
accountable under La. R.S. 10:4-302 (1983). See United States v. Loskocinski, 403 F.
Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d 589 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1977).
A payor bank operating under a Federal Reserve Operating Circular requiring a "wire
advice" of dishonor for items over a stipulated amount must do so, of course, but unless
such Operating Circular itself is the equivalent of an agreement varying La. R.S. 10:4302, such a bank would also have to return the item prior to its midnight deadline to
avoid accountability under section 4-302. See La. R.S. 10:4-103(2) (1983); U.C.C. § 4103, comment 2.
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timely stop payment orders were intended to be covered, while the
defendant payor bank argued that items returned for virtually any reason
were within the intent of the agreement. The item in question had
apparently been subjected to a stop payment order prior to completion
of the payor bank's usual process of posting. Unless the variance agreement is tightly drawn, however, such a payor bank could do as the
2
payor bank in West Side Bank v. Marine National Exchange Bank: '
Make a decision to pay the item, as evidenced by the stamping of
"paid" on the item, file the item in the drawer-customer's account file,
then honor a stop order arriving prior to the (extended) midnight deadline, and return the item to the depository bank as an "unpaid" item.
In that sense, an agreement between banks in variance of the midnight
deadline should carefully distinguish between the timely return of an
item as "unpaid" (for enumerated reasons) and items which although
returned as "unpaid" may in fact be deemed paid under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 10:4-213 and 4-302. Moreover, parties to such agreements should specify the procedure for handling of stop payment orders
which arrive at the payor bank after all of the usual posting steps have
been taken. Under the reasoning of West Side Bank, a payor bank can,
in effect, "unpay" and return such items within its midnight deadlinea degree of payor bank power that neither party may desire the other
to have.
Bank Liability For Cashier's Checks
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal addressed in First
Financial v. First American Bank 22 a commercially familiar transaction:
First American issued its cashier's check 23 to First Financial in exchange
for a personal check held by First Financial and drawn by a First
American checking account customer. Prior to the issuance of the cashier's check, the drawer of the personal check issued-presumably not
in sufficient time to be acted upon-a written stop payment order on

21. 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 507 (1968), discussed in Hersbergen, Developments
in the Law, 1982-1983 -Banking Law, 44 La. L. Rev. 247, 253-61 (1983).
22. 489 So. 2d 388 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
23. A "cashier's check" is referred to, but not defined in La. R.S. 10:4-211(l)(b)
(1983); however, it has been judicially defined as a draft drawn by a bank, as drawer,
on itself as drawee. Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 33 Conn. Supp. 641,
365 A.2d 1222 (1976). By contrast, drafts drawn by one financial institution on another
financial institution are referred to as "bank drafts" or "telicr's checks." See Banco
Ganadero y Agricola v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Malphrus
v. Home Sav. Bank, 44 Misc. 2d 705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965).

1987]

BANKING

the personal check. 24 Because the drawer's stop payment order was
arguably binding under Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:4-403 and 4-303,
First American found itself in a conundrum: unable to charge its customer's checking account 2 for the $1800 amount of the personal check,

24. The drawer of the personal check informed a First American employee (presumably
by telephone) on the day of issuance, Friday, May 3, that she wished to stop payment
on the check, but was advised that the request to stop payment would have to be placed
in writing. It is not clear from the report of the case whether the drawer would have
had time that day to place her stop payment request in writing, but, for whatever reason,
the drawer appeared at First American on Monday, May 6, at 9:00 a.m. and executed
the written request. The written stop payment order, however, did not afford First
American a reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to the exchange of the personal
check for the cashier's check. See Thompson v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 47 Ohio App.
2d 249, 353 N.E.2d 895 (1975); La. R.S. 10:4-403(1). Section 4-403(1), however, validates
oral stop payment orders; thus, unless there was a valid variance agreement, the drawer's
attempted oral stop order should have been deemed received on Friday, May 3-giving
First American a reasonable opportunity to act on it-and the drawer's attempted oral
stop order should not have been thwarted. Even if a contractual stipulation for written
stop orders did exist, such a requirement can be subject to the notion of waiver by the
bank. See Thomas v. Bank of Springfield, 631 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (the
Thomas case does not validate such a stipulation; the court was not required to reach
that issue, in view of the evidence of waiver by the bank).
25. A timely and otherwise valid stop order renders an item "not properly payable"
under La. R.S. 10:4-401 (1983). However, La. R.S. 10:4-403(1) (1983) requires that the
stop order be received by the drawee-payor bank in such manner as "to afford the bank
a reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to any action by the bank with respect to
the item described in R.S. 10:4-303." Exchanging the item for the bank's own cashier's
check, however, is not necessarily an "action by the bank . .. described in R.S. 10:4303." Had the bank certified the personal check, paid it in cash, irrevocably settled for
it, completed the process of posting it, or become accountable for the amount of it under
La. R.S. 10:4-213(d) or 4-302, clearly the drawer's stop payment order would have been
untimely under section 4-303. Section 4-303(l)(d) does contain one "action" category that
the drawee-payor bank could have plausibly asserted in refusing to honor its customer's
stop order: "or otherwise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and
by action its decision to pay the item." UCC comment 3 to section 4-303 does not
preclude the argument that the issuance of a cashier's check in exchange for a personal
check is an "action" which makes a subsequent stop order on the personal check "come
too late" under subsection (1)(d), giving priority, over that stop order, to the bank's
right to charge the customer's account:
The sixth event conferring priority is stated by the language "or otherwise
has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and by action its decision
to pay the item." This general "omnibus" language is necessary to pick up
other possible types of action impossible to specify particularly but where the
bank has examined the account to see if there are sufficient funds and has
taken some action indicating an intention to pay. An example is what has
sometimes been called "sight posting" where the bookkeeper examines the
account and makes a decision to pay but postpones posting. The clause should
be interpreted in the light of Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat. Bank of
South Weymouth, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 670 (1903). It is not intended to refer
to various preliminary acts in no way close to a true decision of the bank to
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and facing liability on an issued cashier's check in that amount. In such

circumstances, First American notified First Financial of its intent not
to honor the cashier's check-in essence, an anticipatory breach of its
26
engagement on the cashier's check.
Casting the case as one of first impression in Louisiana and characterizing the issue as one of a bank's ability to "stop payment" on

a cashier's check, the fifth circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment
in favor of the holder of the cashier's check, First Financial. While

that outcome is no doubt satisfactory, 27 the opinion of the fifth circuit
contains sufficient potential for misleading the reader to warrant comment.
In the first place, a bank issuing a cashier's check has no right to
stop payment in the sense of section 4-403(1). That section provides
that a customer has the right to stop, or countermand, payment of any

item payable for his account. A bank issuing a cashier's check is not
a "customer"

within the meaning of 10:4-403,28 and there is no other

stop payment provision in Title 10. In the second place, while the fifth
circuit correctly notes that the majority of the decisions across the
country parrot the view of Kaufman v. Chase ManhattanBank, National

Association29 that the issuance of a cashier's check constitutes an immediate acceptance of the check, thereby constituting a primary obligation of the issuer and foreclosing a stop order under section 4-303,

such a view is merely a corollary of the basic error in analysis that

pay the item, such as receipt of the item over the counter for deposit, entry
of a provisional credit in a passbook, or the making of a provisional settlement
for the item through the clearing house, by entries in accounts, remittance or
otherwise. All actions of this type are provisional and none of them evidences
the bank's decision to pay the item.
26. The effect of a "stop payment order" from the issuer of a cashier's check to
the holder of the item would simply be to excuse any requirement that the holder thereafter
present the item to the issuer, or that the holder give any notice of dishonor. See La.
R.S. 10:3-511(2)(b) and (3)(b) (1983).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
28. La. R.S. 10:4-104(e) (1983) defines "customer" so as to include a bank carrying
an account with another bank, but a bank issuing a draft on itself would not come within
the definition. Moreover, the issuing bank's customer likewise has no section 4-403 right
to stop payment on a cashier's check, since the item is not one payable from his account.
Wood v. Central Bank of the South, 435 So. 2d 1287 (Ala. App. 1982).
29. 370 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The First Financial opinion cites numerous
decisions following Kaufman.
The Kaufman rationale has also been used by various courts to prevent stop payment
orders on personal money orders, bank money orders and teller's checks, but there has
developed a contrary line of authority on this issue. See First Nat'l Bank v. Duncan Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 656 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Okla. 1987), and cases cited therein.
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cashier's checks can be subjected to a stop order, which view is at best
misleading and at worst, plainly wrong.30
In fact, the issuance of a cashier's check in the form set out in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-104 is simply the issuance of a negotiable
draft or check by a drawer, drawn on itself as drawee. 3' The issuing
bank has no greater liability on the instrument than does any drawer
or maker.3 2 It is true, as the fifth circuit also observes, that cashier's
checks are viewed by the courts and the public as substitutes for cash,
but that perception is one premised not on statutory authority but rather
on the solvency and honesty of banking institutions. No doubt, the
Pope's personal check would enjoy a similar perception.
In most cases it matters little, however, whether a cashier's check
is viewed as accepted in advance upon issuance or not, subject to stop
payment or not, or a "cash equivalent" or not. Whenever an issuing
bank decides to refuse payment on a cashier's check, it usually will be
the loser. But this is so for the normal reasons inherent in the issuance
of negotiable instruments, not because the cashier's check is some kind
of mutant-hybrid instrument. If the issuing bank refuses to pay the
cashier's check because its customer wishes to undo the underlying
transaction, 3 that customer either has a defense against the holder of
the cashier's check, or has no such defense; if the latter, there is no
way for the bank to avoid payment to the holder, and if the former,
there is no way the bank can assert its customer's defenses against the
34
holder, if the holder is a holder in due course.

30. Under La. R.S. 10:4-303 (1983), acceptance of an item cuts off the drawer's
right to stop payment of that item. But an "acceptance" is defined by La. R.S. 10:3410 (1983) as the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as presented, and although
that engagement may consist of the drawee's signature alone, as U.C.C. comment 4 to
section 3-410 points out, the drawee's signature on a draft (issued by another) is sufficient
for an acceptance because the drawee has no reason to sign for any other purpose. But
in the issuance of a cashier's check, there is another purpose for the bank's signatureto properly execute the order on itself as drawer. Thus, in the absence of a second
signature by the issuing bank, there can be no "acceptance" upon issuance of a cashier's
check.
31. La. R.S. 10:3-104(2) (1983). A draft drawn on the drawer is effective as a note.
La. R.S. 10:3-118(a) (1983).
32. See La. R.S. 10:3-413 (1983).
33. It is inferable from the customer's request that the issuing bank dishonor the
cashier's check, or from the customer's stop order on the personal check exchanged for
the cashier's check.
34. Under La. R.S. 10:3-306 (1983), a person without the rights of a holder in due
course "takes the instrument subject to . . . all defenses of any party ....
Thus, an
endorser may raise, as against a holder-not-in-due course, any defense the maker or drawer
might have raised against the payee, including defenses "personal" to the maker or
drawer. See Bush Constr. Co. v. Carr, 486 So. 2d 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); City
Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 434 So. 2d 1299 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Guaranty Bank
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If, as in First Financial,the issuing bank decides for reasons of its
own to refuse to pay the cashier's check, the outcome of the case will
depend upon the status of the holder of the check as a holder in due
course; if the holder is in due course, or has those rights from a prior
transferee,35 the bank's defense will usually be unassertable. 6 Thus, in
First Financial the issuing bank, presumably having a failure of consideration defense or the defense of mistake, would ultimately have to
pay the holder of the cashier's check, if a holder in due course. Unfortunately for issuing banks, those who take a cashier's check will
37
typically be holders in due course.
In summation, the issue raised in cases such as First Financial is:
does either the issuing bank or its customer a" have a right to stop
payment on a cashier's check? The answer is "no" in both cases, at
least in the sense of a section 4-403 stop order.3 9 The issuing bank can,
however, refuse to pay the cashier's check, just as a maker or acceptor
may so refuse. If it does refuse, the case will be decided, as are most
negotiable instruments cases, by a determination of the holder's due
course status under sections 3-104, 3-202, 3-302 and either section 3305 or 3-306. 0 To avoid such problems, the issuing bank should treat
a cashier's check as a functional equivalent of a certified check, making
an immediate debit to the customer's account, or treat the cashier's
check as a functional equivalent of a payment in cash, 41 memorializing

& Trust Co. v. Carter, 394 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 399 So. 2d 599
(1981).
35. La. R.S. 10:3-201 (1983).
36. La. R.S. 10:3-305 (1983).
37. When the cashier's check has been issued to the bank's customer and thereafter
transferred to a retailer or creditor, that transferee, if in good faith, will almost certainly
be a holder in due course. On the other hand, where (as in First Financial) the cashier's
check is issued directly to the merchant or creditor, the transferee's status as a holder
in due course may, or may not, cut off the bank's defenses, dependent on the meaning
in La. R.S. 10:3-305(2) (1983) of the language "a holder in due course . . . takes ...
free from . . . all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt" (emphasis added). It would seem that such a transferee as in First Financialhas,
in fact, "dealt with" the issuing bank. The decision in Travi Constr. Corp. v. First
Bristol County Nat'l Bank, 405 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980), on facts identical to
those of First Financial, so holds.
38. The term refers, in this instance, both to a person purchasing a cashier's check
by issuing his own personal check to the bank therefor, and to the bank's checking
account customer who, as in First Financial,may be adversely affected by the act of the
bank in issuing a cashier's check to the payee of the customer's personal check. By
"adversely affected" is meant the possibility that such issuance may cut off the right of
the customer to stop payment on his own personal check, as suggested at supra note 25.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
40. La. R.S. 10:3-104, 3-202, 3-302, 3-305, 3-306 (1983).
41. If the personal check in First Financial was not postdated, there was seemingly
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the right to so treat the cashier's check in the bank-customer agreement.
In that way, issuance of the cashier's check would trigger the provisions
of section 4-303(1)(a) or (b), thereby rendering untimely a subsequent
customer stop order on the exchanged personal check. Without such an
agreement, the bank is left to argue that the issuance of the cashier's
42
check constitutes a "decision to pay" under section 4-303(1)(d).
ITEMS IN THE BANK COLLECTION PROCESS

Handling and Payment of Items Not Properly Indorsed
Adoption of portions of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")
in 1974 did not, in general, bring substantial change to the law of
negotiable instruments in Louisiana.4 1 One change of substance, however,
was brought about by adoption of section 3-419 of the UCC in Title
10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. 4 Under this section, payment of
an instrument bearing a forged indorsement now makes the payor liable
to the true owner .4 5 The new cause of action created by section 3-419
also created a number of questions not previously addressed by Louisiana
courts, including: 1) the liability, if any, of collecting banks which
handle, but do not, in the normal sense of the word, "pay" forged
indorsement instruments; 2) the scope of section 3-419(l)'s "true owner"
label; 3) the extent of the payor's liability; 4) the defenses assertable
by the payor-defendant; and 5) whether a missing indorsement is to be

no reason for First Financial to exchange it for a cashier's check, as opposed to demanding
a cash payment for it; therefore, one suspects the check was postdated, and if so, a
certification of the check would have protected First American under section 4-303(l)(a).
Alternatively, if the check was not postdated, then the issuance of the cashier's check
should be viewed as a purchase by First Financial with the cash due to it as the holder
demanding, and due, payment. So viewed, the issuance of the cashier's check would be
a form of payment in cash under §4-303(l)(a).
42. See supra note 25. A UCC draftsman has written of the language "otherwise
evidenced by action its decision to pay the item" that "this action must be closely related
to the decision of the appropriate [bank] employee that there are sufficient funds to pay
the item, not mere receipting for the item in a passbook or other preliminary acts in no
way related to a true decision to pay" (emphasis omitted). Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle
With Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 265, 294. It is at least a plausible argument that
the issuance of a cashier's check in exchange for a personal check would only follow
such a decision to pay.
43. Louisiana adopted the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law ("NIL") in 1904.
44. La. R.S. 10:3-419 (1983).
45. Under the rule of M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
159 La. 752, 106 So. 292 (1925), a drawee-payor bank was liable for payment of a forged
indorsement instrument' only to its drawer-customer, not to the payee or other true owner
whose signature had been forged. See Hersbergen, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1972-73 Term-Commercial Paper, 34 La. L. Rev. 293-96 (1974).
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treated as a "forged" indorsement under section 3-419(1). Satisfactory
answers to these questions have emerged from decisions of the various
courts of the country, which decisions Louisiana courts may find persuasive.4 Recent Louisiana decisions have addressed some of the abovementioned questions of statutory construction.
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal addressed the meaning

47
of "true owner" under section 3-419(1) in Pattersonv. Livingston Bank,
in which the plaintiff-payee had apparently never actually possessed the

check in question, although it had been mailed to him. 48 Of course,

when a payee in possession of an unindorsed check loses it or it is
stolen from him, he is clearly the "true owner" having a cause of
action under section 3-419(1). But in the case of the payee-addressee
who never received the check, or in the case of the co-payee who is
neither the addressee nor the one to whom the check is delivered by
the drawer, applicability of the "true owner" label is less clear. By
utilizing the notion of constructive delivery so as to make the payee in
Patterson the true owner of an undelivered check, the first circuit decision
also suggests that a co-payee to whom a check is not delivered is likewise
a true owner by constructive possession. 49 The plaintiff cannot merely

allege true owner status, however; he must plead facts which show either
actual or constructive possession. 0

46. See Hersbergen, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Banking Law, 42 La. L.
Rev. 330-31 (1982). The decisions of other jurisdictions under a uniform or common
statute have traditionally been accepted in Louisiana as persuasive on questions of interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958); Standard
Oil Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 210 La. 428, 27 So. 2d 268 (1946); Broussard v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 249 La.
713, 190 So. 2d 233 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909, 87 S. Ct. 855 (1967).
47. 509 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987). Cf. Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Bank of Commerce, 764 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985) (payee whose name was placed onchecks as part of a third party's fraudulent scheme was not a "true owner" where the
checks were not mailed to the named payee).
48. See Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass.
1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962).
49. Most of the decisions nation-wide permit such a co-payee to sue as a true owner.
See Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 253 Cal. App. 2d 368,
61 Cal. Rptr. 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Barnett Bank v. Lipp, 364 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); Trust Co. v. Refrigeration Supplier, Inc., 241 Ga. 406, 246 S.E.2d 282
(1978); contra Burritt Mut. Sav. Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 180 Conn. 71, 428 A.2d
333 (1980); Humberto Decorators, Inc. v. Plaza Nat'l Bank, 180 N.J. Super. 170, 434
A.2d 618 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). Absent contrary proof, such a co-payee
would be entitled to one-half of the face amount of the check. Stapleton v. First Sec.
Bank, 675 P.2d 83 (Mont. 1983). Cf. Lund v. Chem. Bank, 665 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (signature by one co-payee where both were partners).
50. Sunbelt Factors, Inc. v. Bank of Gonzales, 481 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1985). Cf. Lund.
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A most significant issue not expressly addressed by section 3-419(1)
is whether the true owner's cause of action is prescribed by one year,

as a delictual action under Louisiana Civil Code article 3492, or by five
years, as an action on a negotiable instrument, under Louisiana Civil
Code article 3498. 51 UCC comment 2 to section 3-419(1)-and conven-

tional commercial law wisdom-views the section 3-419(1) action
as not
2
one "on" the instrument, but rather as an action in tort.1
In the recent past, Louisiana decisions have failed to recognize the

importance of distinguishing between actions on an instrument53 and
those actions only involving an instrument.5 4 In Strother v. National
American Bank,55 for instance, Civil Code article 3498's precursor, article
3540, was held applicable to the act of a collecting bank cashing checks

contrary to a restrictive indorsement in violation of what is now Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-419(1). Although Strother was not a Louisiana Commercial Laws-Title 10 decision, it was relied on by the fifth
circuit court in a Commercial Laws case, Johnny Turcich, Jr., Inc. v.
First National Bank,5 6 holding that a bank customer's complaint regarding improper payment of a stale check was within the "actions on
instruments" language of what is now article 3498.1 7 In 1984, relying
on Strother and Turcich, the third circuit court held in Top Crop
Seed & Supply Co. v. Bank of Southwest Louisiana58 that the fiveyear limitation of article 3540, rather thau the one-year period of
article 3536, applied to a section 3-419(1) cause of action. The reliance

51. The issue presents a good example of the effect of La. R.S. 10:1-103 (1983):
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Title, the other laws of Louisiana
shall apply." Nothing in Title 10 addresses the applicable prescriptive period, although
La. R.S. 10:3-122 (1983) does address the issue of the accrual of the cause of action.
52. The comment recognizes that the true owner's action in section 3-419(1) is an
adoption of the common law conversion action, and that "[the action is not on the
instrument, but in tort for its conversion."
53. That is, actions relating to an engagement of a party reflected by that party's
signature, such as actions founded upon drawer, maker or acceptor engagements pursuant
to section 3-413, or indorser engagements pursuant to section 3-414, and those of accommodation parties and guarantors pursuant to sections 3-415 and 3-416.
54. The transfer or presentment of an instrument is an act having liability consequences, but which does not give rise to a cause of action "on" the transferred instrument.
See La. R.S. 10:3-417(1) & (2), 4-207(1) & (2) (1983). The same may be said for the
cause of action under section 3-419.
55. 384 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
56. 427 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
57. The Strother and Turcich decisions are discussed in Hersbergen, supra note 21,
at 262-64. More or less the identical issue to that in Strother has been decided similar
in Alaska, Oregon, Missouri and-California. In those states, the shorter tort action
prescriptive periods have been held inapplicable to "conversion" actions. See Vest v. First
Nat'l Bank, 659 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1983), and cases cited therein.
58. 457 So. 2d 273 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
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was misplaced. Even if Strother is viewed as a defensible pre-UCC
decision, it clearly would be incorrect under the Louisiana Commercial
Laws enactment of the UCC; Turcich is likewise a questionable decision,
for a failure to pay properly-payable items, or a failure to dishonor
not-properly-payable items, simply creates an action for breach of the
bank-customer agreement,5 9 rather than an action "on an instrument."
The Louisiana Supreme Court has now expressly disagreed with the Top
Crop decision, and implicitly undermined Strotherand Turcich, in Daube
6 °
v. Bruno.
Before the court in Daube was the same issue as in Top Crop:
whether the section 3-419(1) action is prescribed as an article 3492
delictual action, or as an article 3498 action "on a negotiable instrument." The court not only held that section 3-419(1) authorizes a delictual action, prescriptible by one year (and that the section does not
additionally authorize an action "on" the instrument), it further held
that in both the fifth circuit court's decision in Daube and the third
circuit's decision in Top Crop, the concept of an action "on a ,negotiable
instrument" had been misunderstood. "An action on a negotiable or
non-negotiable instrument, as envisioned by Civil Code art. 3498," the
court explained, "is one by the holder of a note [or draft] against a
defendant whose name is on the note [or draft] as maker, indorser, or
in some other capacity. '61 Thus, the prescriptive period of article 3498
"applies only to actions on the instrument itself, those actions for the
breach of the contract which the note [or draft] represents, for the
62
payment of the note [or draft] according to its terms."
The Louisiana Supreme Court has clearly and correctly distinguished
between actions based on an engagement represented by a signature on
an instrument and those based on ancillary claims arising in the context
of an instrument, but which are not premised on some engagement
reflected on the face of the instrument. 63 Although the Daube decision
distinguishes the Turcich case," it is clear from the court's discussion
of the concept of an action on an instrument that breaches of the bankcustomer contract by a drawee-payor bank appropriately fall under the
ten-year prescriptive period of article 3499. The cause of action for
payment over a timely stop order would be affected by the Daube
decision, but payment of an item that bears a forgery or an alteration

59. See generally Hersbergen, supra note 12. A telling point on this issue is that the
bank-customer agreement can be breached by improper handling of a non-negotiable
instrument.
60. 493 So. 2d 606 (La. 1986). The court in Daube expressly overruled Top Crop.
61. Id. at 610.
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 53-54.
64. 493 So. 2d at 610, n.l.
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is subject to the three-year prescriptive period of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 10:4-406(4), and the action for wrongful dishonor has long been
held in Louisiana to be delictual in nature and subject therefore to a
one-year prescriptive period. 65 Bank lawyers should perhaps consider a
bank-customer contractual stipulation limiting the viability of actions
based on payments over valid stop orders to considerably less than ten
years.

66

65. See Galloway v. Vivian State Bank, 168 La. 691, 123 So. 126 (1929) (allowing
damages for humiliation in a wrongful dishonor case); Spearing v. Whitney-Central Nat'l
Bank, 129 La. 607, 56 So. 548 (1911) (characterizing the wrongful dishonor action as
one governed by La. Civ. Code art. 2315).
66. Since Title 10 does not contain a section 4-403 prescriptive provision, the use of
La. R.S. 10:4-103 to "vary" the prescriptive period is problematic. UCC comment 1 to
section 4-103, however, clearly favors the concept of abbreviated time limitations in general:
"In view of the technical complexities of the field of bank collections, the enormous
number of items handled by banks, [and] the . . . certainty of changing conditions ... ,
it would be unwise to freeze present methods of operation by mandatory statutory rules."
UCC section 4-406 (La. R.S. 10:4-406 (1983)) does contain a prescriptive period, in
subsection four, limiting to one year the time within which a customer may sue a bank
for improper payment of altered checks and checks bearing forged signatures, and limiting
to three years actions involving indorsements. In New York Credit Men's Adjustment
Bureau, Inc. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 41 A.D.2d 912, 343 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div.
1973), an agreement between bank and customer, limiting the time within which the
customer must notify the bank of forgeries of his own name and of indorsers' names to
thirty days, and six months, respectively, was upheld as "in the nature of an abbreviated
period of limitations." Id. at 914, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 540. The negative implication of Civil
Code article 3471 would permit a contractual shortening of a prescriptive period, particularly in view of the comments thereto. See Lester Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241
La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961); Note, Insurance-Validity of Contractual Limitation of
Prescriptive Period-Article 3460, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, 16 Tul. L. Rev. 625
(1942).

